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INTRODUCTION 
In vitro fertilization (IVF) has become increasingly popular since the 
first “test tube baby” was born more than thirty years ago.1 As people are 
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 1. Susan Donaldson James, Test Tube Baby Louise Brown Turns 35, ABC NEWS (July 25, 2013), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Health/test-tube-baby-louise-brown-turns-35-medical/story?id=19764283 
[https://perma.cc/4YBX-HSNC]. 
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delaying childbirth in favor of other pursuits, couples often turn to the 
harvesting and freezing of eggs, sperm, and embryos2 to achieve these 
goals.3 Since 2007, the American birth rate has been declining steadily.4 
Despite this decline, the births of babies conceived using IVF has been 
increasing; in 2015, IVF accounted for about 1.6% of all babies born in 
the United States.5 This is quite a feat, as the process of harvesting, 
fertilizing, and storing eggs or embryos is expensive and invasive.6 “In an 
in vitro fertilization procedure, eggs are collected from the woman’s 
ovaries and mixed with the man’s sperm outside the body, usually in a 
glass dish in a laboratory. . . . The fertilized eggs are then cultivated for a 
few days in the laboratory and transferred to the woman’s uterus.”7 “As an 
alternative to immediate implantation, pre-zygotes may be cryopreserved 
indefinitely in liquid nitrogen for later use.”8 However, many disputes 
have arisen9 when a couple creates embryos and stores them but later 
divorces. What happens to the frozen embryos? 
This issue is further complicated when instead of having both a man 
and a woman contribute their genetic material to create an embryo, only 
one spouse contributes genetic material and a donor provides the 
additional eggs or sperm. The analysis changes from a “dual-progenitor” 
dispute, where both parties to the litigation have contributed genetic 
material, to a “sole-progenitor” dispute, where only one of the parties to 
the litigation has contributed genetic material. 
                                                     
 2. There are biological developmental differences between an embryo, a pre-embryo, a  
pre-zygote, etc.; however, for the sake of simplicity, this Note will only use the term “embryo”. See 
generally Carl H. Coleman, Procreative Liberty and Contemporaneous Choice: An Inalienable Rights 
Approach to Frozen Embryo Disputes, 84 MINN. L. REV. 55, 127 n.1 (1999). 
 3. See Jen Christensen, Record Number of Women Using IVF to Get Pregnant, CNN  
(Feb. 18, 2014, 2:36 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/02/17/health/record-ivf-use/ [https://perma.cc/ 
4YBX-HSNC]. 
 4. Id. 
 5. See ART Success Rates, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/art/artdata/ [https://perma.cc/GV7V-T6CH]; see also Christensen, supra note 3.  
 6. See Christensen, supra note 3. The average cost of one IVF treatment in the United States is 
$12,400. Id. 
 7. What is IVF?, CTR. FOR HUM. REPROD., https://www.centerforhumanreprod.com/services/ 
infertility-treatments/ivf/ [https://perma.cc/5MG3-6B88]. 
 8. Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 175 (N.Y. 1998). 
 9. See, e.g., Danielle & Andy Mayoras, Embryo Lawsuit Between Sofia Vergara and Nick Loeb 
Getting Out of Hand, FORBES (Nov. 18, 2016, 8:48 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
trialandheirs/2016/11/18/embryo-lawsuit-between-sofia-vergara-and-nick-loeb-getting-out-of-hand/ 
#7c3011175cd0; Katie Mettler, Frozen Pre-Embryos: Life or ‘Marital Property’? Mo. Court Decides 
Tough Custody Case, WASH. POST (Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/morning-mix/wp/2016/11/17/ex-husband-in-frozen-embryo-dispute-cant-be-forced-to-become-
a-father-mo-court-rules/?utm_term=.4d54c751f3c5 [https://perma.cc/XN86-U64R]; Madeline 
Schwartz, Who Owns Pre-Embryos?, NEW YORKER (Apr. 28, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/ 
tech/elements/who-owns-pre-embryos [https://perma.cc/5CDC-BHSD]. 
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As of this Note’s publication, only two appellate decisions dealing 
with sole-progenitor disputes have been issued,10 and the solutions posed 
by these courts are not ideal. Courts have attempted to apply current  
dual-progenitor analyses to the sole-progenitor context, but they simply do 
not apply in the same fashion. Sole-progenitor situations are very different 
from dual-progenitor situations and should be subject to a different 
analysis; 
[b]ecause an individual who lacks a genetic connection to an embryo 
has a lesser stake in how the embryo is disposed, the resolution of 
disputes over the disposition of embryos created with donor sperm 
and/or eggs requires a different set of rules than those that apply to 
disputes over embryos created with both partners’ gametes.11 
Therefore, because analyses applied in the dual-progenitor context are not 
appropriate in the sole-progenitor context, the partner whose genetic 
material was not used must rely on different theories if they want to claim 
ownership over any frozen embryos at the time of divorce. These theories 
can range from marital presumption or community property rights to 
claims of parentage through intentionality. However, as this Note will 
argue, none of these claims of ownership by the non-genetic spouse are 
sufficient to overcome concerns of forced procreation on the genetic 
progenitor. It is unconscionable for a court to allow a non-genetic spouse 
to have embryos implanted that will force the genetic progenitor of those 
embryos to become a parent against his or her will. Under current 
analytical frameworks, this is a distinct possibility. Because of this 
concern and the lack of sufficient remedies provided by the current 
frameworks, this Note advocates for a new framework that favors genetics 
over all other considerations and awards absolute ownership rights to the 
sole-genetic progenitor. 
This genetic framework will encourage judicial efficiency by 
creating a bright line rule not only for courts but also for couples 
considering IVF—giving couples more clarity as to the disposition of their 
embryos should they separate. Disputes involving only one genetic 
progenitor will likely continue to arise as IVF technology becomes more 
common and affordable. Additionally, as same-sex marriage is now legal 
across all the states, same-sex couples will likely engage in efforts to have 
children, which may involve IVF, and may get divorced.12 These issues 
                                                     
 10. See Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261 (Wash. 2002); In re Marriage of Nash, 2009 WL 
1514842, at *1 (Wash. App. 2009). 
 11. Coleman, supra note 2, at 115. 
 12. See Paige Chamberlain Ornduff, Who Gets the Bun That Doesn’t Make It to the Oven? The 
Rights to Pre-Embryos for Individuals in Same-Sex Relationships, 8 CHARLESTON L. REV. 557,  
582–90 (2014). 
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are only beginning and this Note seeks to shed some light on this growing 
area of law. 
Part I of this Note provides some background on the current 
frameworks being used by courts in dual-progenitor disputes, while Part 
II presents the only two cases to deal with sole-genetic progenitor disputes 
and details how the courts conducted their analyses. Part III explains how 
courts establish legal parentage and how these legal parentage standards 
apply to frozen embryo disputes, specifically ones that involve only one 
genetic progenitor. Part IV proposes a new genetic framework to assist in 
the resolution of these issues. This Note concludes with a recommendation 
for future legislative intervention to aid in the widespread and uniform 
resolution of these types of disputes. 
I. DUAL-GENETIC PROGENITOR FRAMEWORKS 
While frozen embryo jurisprudence is still developing, courts have 
settled on three main analyses to resolve disputes. However, before a court 
can begin to do an analysis under one of these analytical frameworks, the 
court must first determine what type of property is in dispute.13 The court 
must ask: What is an embryo? Is it property, a child, or something in 
between: a special kind of property with protections and considerations?14 
Most courts find that the embryo is a special kind of property.15 One 
court succinctly stated that embryos are not “persons” or “property,” but 
instead “occupy an interim category that entitles them to special respect 
because of their potential for human life.”16 This means that each party has 
an ownership interest in the embryo, in that they have decision-making 
authority over its disposition, but they do not have true property interests.17 
After a court determines the property category that the embryo 
occupies, it must then decide which analysis is proper to determine 
ownership rights or custody of the embryo.18 The analytical frameworks 
that have been developed are the (1) contemporaneous mutual assent 
approach,19 (2) contractual approach,20 and (3) balancing test approach.21 
It is relevant to note that these frameworks have arisen through  
                                                     
 13. Id. at 568. 
 14. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 594–97 (Tenn. 1992). 
 15. See id. at 597. 
 16. Id. 
 17. See id. 
 18. Ornduff, supra note 12, at 570. 
 19. See In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 782 (Iowa 2003). 
 20. See Szafranski v. Dunston, 34 N.E.3d 1132, 1137 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015); Kass v. Kass, 696 
N.E.2d 174, 181 (N.Y. 1998); In re Marriage of Dahl, 194 P.3d 834, 840 (Or. Ct. App. 2008); Davis, 
842 S.W.2d at 597; Roman v. Roman, 193 S.W.3d 40, 50 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006); Litowitz v. Litowitz, 
48 P.3d 261, 268 (Wash. 2002). 
 21. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 603. 
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dual-progenitor disputes, where both spouses have contributed genetic 
material to the creation of an embryo. 
A. Contemporaneous Mutual Assent Approach 
One of the frameworks used by courts when deciding disputes 
involving frozen embryos is the contemporaneous mutual assent approach. 
Under this framework, “decisions about the disposition of frozen embryos 
belong to the couple that created the embryo, with each partner entitled to 
an equal say in how the embryos should be disposed.”22 This approach 
proposes that “no embryo should be used by either partner, donated to 
another patient, used in research, or destroyed without the mutual consent 
of the couple that created the embryo.”23 Under this approach, 
advance instructions would not be treated as binding contracts. If 
either partner has a change of mind about disposition decisions made 
in advance, that person’s current objection would take precedence 
over the prior consent. If one of the partners rescinds an advance 
disposition decision and the other does not, the mutual consent 
principle would not be satisfied and the previously agreed-upon 
disposition decision could not be carried out.24 
One court implemented a contemporaneous mutual assent–contractual 
hybrid approach and held that parties’ prior agreements were and are 
binding unless either party changes his or her mind about the disposition 
of any frozen embryos.25 The court found it would be against public policy 
to “enforce a prior agreement between the parties in this highly personal 
area of reproductive choice when one of the parties has changed his or her 
mind.”26 
The biggest flaw with this framework is that it may cause the parties 
to reach a “stalemate.”27 As one court noted, “This approach strikes us as 
being totally unrealistic. If the parties could reach an agreement, they 
would not be in court.”28 Moreover, it places a lot of power in the hands 
of the parties to reject the other party’s proposed use of the embryos, 
causing potentially drawn-out and contentious litigation. For these 
reasons, this approach is both unfavorable and unrealistic. 
                                                     
 22. Coleman, supra note 2, at 81. 
 23. Id. at 110. 
 24. Id. at 110–11. 
 25. In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 782 (Iowa 2003) (quoting J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 
707, 719 (N.J. 2001)). 
 26. Id. at 781. 
 27. Ornduff, supra note 12, at 574. 
 28. Reber v. Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131, 1135 n.5 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012). 
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B. Contractual Approach 
The most popular framework is the contractual approach. Using the 
contractual approach, courts evaluate the contract(s) that the parties 
entered into when commencing the IVF process, most often with the IVF 
facility.29 This is a simple way for courts to examine the parties’ intent 
before the embryo existed. 
In Kass v. Kass, a New York court found that the consent form the 
couple signed prior to undergoing the IVF process was a binding 
agreement that indicated their mutual assent to donate their embryos30 for 
research in the event of divorce.31 Both parties later signed a divorce 
agreement stating that the frozen embryos should be disposed of in a 
manner outlined in the consent form and that neither party nor anyone else 
would lay claim to custody.32 About a month later, the wife filed an action 
for sole custody of the embryos so that she could try the implantation 
process again and have another child.33 The husband maintained his desire 
for the embryos to be donated for research, as the couple had agreed in 
their initial contract.34 The Court of Appeals, the highest court in New 
York, found that the agreement was binding and manifested a mutual 
assent that the embryos be donated for research.35 
In Kass, the court relied upon the original contract as evidence of the 
parties’ intent before the embryos came into existence.36 Because there 
was a contract involved, the court was tasked with enforcing the contract 
and using it as evidence of the parties’ prior intent.37 Proponents of this 
approach find that using contracts is a much easier way for courts to 
adjudicate issues like this one because it does not require the court to 
evaluate or balance the interests and desires of the parties. Moreover, 
courts have held that an agreement, specifically regarding the disposition 
                                                     
 29. See Coleman, supra note 2, at 71. 
 30. The court in Kass chose to use the term “‘pre-zygotes,’ which are defined in the record as 
‘eggs which have been penetrated by sperm but have not yet joined genetic material.’” Kass v. Kass, 
696 N.E.2d 174, n.1 (N.Y. 1998) (internal citation omitted). 
 31. Id. at 181. 
 32. Id. at 177. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 175. 
 35. Id. at 181; see also In re Marriage of Dahl, 194 P.3d 834, 842 (Or. Ct. App. 2008) (finding 
that the agreement signed by the couple designating custody/exclusive rights to transfer or dispose of 
the embryos to the wife indicated intent for the wife to get custody); Roman v. Roman, 193 S.W.3d 
40, 50 (Tex. App. 2006) (finding that an agreement providing that embryos were to be discarded at 
the time of divorce served state public policy by allowing parties to voluntarily decide the disposition 
of the frozen embryos prior to cryopreservation). 
 36. Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 180–81. 
 37. Id. at 182. 
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of frozen embryos, should be presumed valid and enforced as between the 
progenitors.38 
However, critics of the contractual approach argue that it 
“insufficiently protects the individual and societal interests at stake.”39 
Take Massachusetts for example, where the Supreme Court declined to 
honor an advance agreement regarding the disposition of embryos on 
public policy grounds in A.Z. v. B.Z.40 The couple had signed an agreement 
stating that in the event of divorce or separation, the embryos would be 
returned to the wife for implantation.41 While the couple was separated, 
the wife had one embryo implanted.42 During the divorce proceedings, the 
husband filed for an injunction to prevent the wife from implanting any 
more embryos.43 The court refused to enforce the original IVF agreement 
granting the wife use of the embryos because it would compel the husband 
to become a parent against his will.44 “As a matter of public policy, [the 
court] conclude[d] that forced procreation is not an area amenable to 
judicial enforcement.”45 
In Davis v. Davis, the Supreme Court of Tennessee reached a similar 
conclusion. While that court found that agreements between progenitors 
should be presumed valid and be enforced, in the event that there is no 
prior agreement between the parties, the court must instead weigh the 
interests and burdens of the parties.46 In weighing the interests of the 
parties, heavy favor should be shown towards a party wishing to avoid 
procreation.47 The court recognized that “[o]rdinarily, the party wishing to 
avoid procreating should prevail, assuming that the other party has a 
reasonable possibility of achieving parenthood by means other than use of 
the preembryos in question.”48 Applying this holding, if given a  
dual-progenitor situation where one party wants to implant the embryos 
and have more children while the other party wants to dispose of or donate 
the embryos, the court should rule in favor of the party wishing to dispose 
of or donate the embryos because otherwise, the court would essentially 
be forcing the other party to become a biological parent against that party’s 
                                                     
 38. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992). 
 39. See Coleman, supra note 2, at 88. 
 40. A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1057–58 (Mass. 2000). 
 41. Id. at 1054. 
 42. Id. at 1053. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 1057–58. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
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will. As the court in A.Z. v. B.Z. expressed, this is a violation of public 
policy.49 
Notwithstanding these concerns, the Davis court found that this 
preference for avoiding forced procreation is not absolute.50 It may be 
overcome by a showing that the party wishing to implant the embryos 
cannot achieve biological parenthood through any other means.51 This 
situation usually arises in situations where one party is rendered infertile 
due to medical treatment but was able to contribute gametes to make 
embryos prior to the treatments.52 Under those circumstances, the 
presumption against forced procreation can be overcome to aid parties in 
exercising their constitutional rights to be parents.53 
While the contractual approach is more straightforward because 
courts are only tasked with enforcing the contracts signed by the parties, 
which indicate a clear manifestation of the parties’ intent regarding 
disposition of any remaining embryos, contracts that allow for the 
possibility of forced procreation create serious public policy concerns. 
C. Balancing Test Approach 
The last analytical framework that courts consider to resolve frozen 
embryo disputes is the balancing test approach. Using the balancing test, 
a court weighs “the parties’ relative interests with respect to the 
[embryos].”54 Consider Reber v. Reiss, where the court found that the 
balancing approach was the more suitable test and that often a party’s 
inability to have a child will weigh in that party’s favor.55 In Reber, a 
couple created embryos through IVF prior to the wife undergoing 
chemotherapy for breast cancer.56 When the couple split up, the wife 
wanted ownership of the embryos so she could implant them, as they were 
her only chance to have biological children.57 However, the husband 
wanted the embryos to be destroyed and discarded.58 The court found that 
                                                     
 49. A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1057–58. 
 50. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604. 
 51. Id. Cf. J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 717 (N.J. 2001) (finding that, in balancing the interests, 
the wife’s right to not procreate outweighed the husband’s right to procreate because he had other 
reasonable means of reproducing). 
 52. See, e.g., Szafranski v. Dunston, 34 N.E.3d 1132, 1136 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015) (appellee 
commenced the IVF process to cryopreserve embryos before being treated for lymphoma, treatments 
for which would likely render her infertile); Reber v. Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131, 1132–33 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2012) (wife underwent the IVF procedure to freeze embryos prior to treatment for breast cancer). 
 53. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (holding that one has a basic, 
fundamental right to procreate and be a parent). 
 54. Szafranski, 34 N.E.3d at 1161. 
 55. Reber, 42 A.3d at 1142. 
 56. Id. at 1132–33. 
 57. Id. at 1133. 
 58. Id. 
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the wife’s desire and inability to have children outweighed the husband’s 
desire to not be a forced biological parent.59 The court granted her 
ownership of the embryos because she had no reasonable alternative to 
biological procreation.60 This decision perfectly exemplifies the 
suggestion by the Davis61 court that the presumption against forced 
procreation is not absolute and can be overcome. 
However, allowing courts to balance the interests of the parties 
involves more judicial interference than the contractual or 
contemporaneous mutual assent approaches, making the balancing test a 
less desirable framework. While the balancing test approach does give the 
court more leeway to consider all facets of the issue, it also gives the court 
a large amount of discretion in deciding these cases, which may lead to 
more appeals and a general lack of consensus. Additionally, there are 
public policy concerns that courts should not interfere and make decisions 
in this very personal and emotional area of a person’s life.62 
II. SOLE-GENETIC PROGENITOR CASES 
Only two appellate cases have been decided thus far where only one 
of the parties to the litigation was a genetic progenitor.63 In these cases, 
the courts attempted to apply the above analytical frameworks in order to 
resolve the disputes but ran into problems. 
A. Litowitz v. Litowitz 
In Litowitz v. Litowitz, the Washington State Supreme Court decided 
a case of first impression regarding the disposition of frozen embryos64 
when only one of the parties was the genetic progenitor.65 The married 
couple created five embryos, with sperm from the husband and eggs from 
a donor.66 The couple had three of the embryos implanted into a surrogate 
who delivered a child, while the remaining two embryos stayed frozen in 
                                                     
 59. Id. at 1134; see also Szafranski, 34 N.E.3d at 1161 (affirming a determination based on both 
an oral contract and a balancing test that the appellee’s right to procreate outweighed the interests of 
the appellant to avoid forced procreation because she had created the embryos before undergoing 
medical treatment that rendered her infertile). 
 60. Reber, 42 A.3d at 1142. 
 61. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992). 
 62. In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 779 (Iowa 2003); see also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 
405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). 
 63. See Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261, 263 (Wash. 2002); In re Marriage of Nash, 2009 WL 
1514842, at *1 (Wash. App. 2009). 
 64. The court refers to the entity as a “pre-embryo.” Litowitz, 48 P.3d at 262. For simplicity’s 
sake, this Note will only use the term “embryo.” See text accompanying supra note 2. 
 65. Litowitz, 48 P.3d at 262, 265. 
 66. Id. at 262. 
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cryogenic storage.67 The couple had entered into a contract with the IVF 
facility and mutually agreed that after five years, the embryos were to be 
thawed but not allowed to undergo further development, unless the couple 
was granted an extension.68 The contract also stated in the event that the 
parties are unable to reach a mutual agreement regarding the disposition 
of the embryos, that the couple must petition the court for determination.69 
When the couple divorced, the wife expressed her desire to implant 
the embryos in a surrogate in order to have more children, while the 
husband wanted to put the remaining embryos up for adoption.70 The 
parties had entered into a contract with the egg donor, which gave sole 
rights of ownership over the eggs to the husband and wife.71 The wife 
argued that she should be awarded equal rights to the remaining embryos 
by virtue of the egg donor contract, as she could not claim a right of 
ownership arising from biology.72 The wife argued that because both she 
and her husband had equal rights to the eggs, they also had equal rights to 
the resulting embryos.73 The court did not agree.74 It recognized that the 
donor contract gave equal rights to the couple over the eggs but that those 
ownership rights did not extend to the embryos; any rights the wife had to 
the eggs via the egg donor contract were extinguished when the eggs were 
fertilized.75 The ownership rights did not transfer because the eggs became 
new entities: embryos.76 The court recognized that because the wife had 
not contributed any genetic material to these embryos and was not 
biologically related to them, “any right she may have to the [embryos] 
must be based solely upon contract.”77 As a result, the court applied the 
contractual approach and evaluated each party’s rights based upon the 
contract they entered into with the IVF facility.78 
In adopting this contractual approach, the court declined to address 
the relevant issues associated with sole-progenitor disputes and only held 
that the contract should be enforced as written, which provided for the 
thawing of the embryos.79 In reaching this determination, the court found: 
                                                     
 67. Id. at 262–63. 
 68. Id. at 263–64. 
 69. Id. at 263. 
 70. Id. at 264. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 267. 
 73. Id. at 266, 267. 
 74. Id. at 267. 
 75. Id. at 269. 
 76. Id.  
 77. Id. at 267. 
 78. Id. at 271. 
 79. Id. This case was peculiar in that the court did not actually award the embryos to either party. 
The court only held that the contract should be enforced as written, which provided for the thawing of 
the embryos. It did note that because more than five years had passed since the execution of the 
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“It is not necessary for this court to engage in a legal, medical or 
philosophical discussion whether the [embryos] in this case are ‘children,’ 
nor whether Petitioner (who was not a biological participant) is a 
progenitor as is Respondent (who was a biological participant).”80 In so 
holding, the court failed to set a firm and guiding precedent. 
B. In re Marriage of Nash 
Similarly, in In re Marriage of Nash, the court began with a 
contractual analysis when dealing with another sole-genetic progenitor 
case; however, the court was unable to reach a determination and ended 
up applying a balancing test.81 In this case, a married couple used IVF to 
inject the husband’s sperm into donor eggs, and when the couple got 
divorced, they had to decide who should have ownership over the 
remaining embryos.82 The wife wanted the embryos to be disposed of, but 
the husband wanted to keep them in case he decided to have more children 
through a surrogate.83 Interestingly, the contract the couple signed with the 
fertility clinic gave the wife, who did not contribute genetic material, the 
rights to the embryos if the parties divorced and the issue was not 
addressed in the settlement.84 In an odd twist, because the parties 
addressed this issue during mediation, even though they did not fully 
resolve it, the court concluded that the issue was addressed in the 
settlement, and therefore, the wife no longer had a right to the embryos by 
way of the contract.85 Because the contract was no longer applicable, the 
appellate court applied a balancing test and affirmed the trial court’s 
decision to award the father, as the genetic progenitor, the embryos, noting 
that the wife did not have any prospective parental rights to the embryos.86 
This case follows a similar pattern as Litowitz: any rights to the 
embryos that the wife could claim could only be based on contract because 
she had no biological or genetic connection to the embryos.87 However, 
the distinction here is that the Nash contract was no longer applicable to 
the situation and therefore could not be enforced, unlike the contract in 
Litowitz. Because the contract could not be relied upon in Nash, the court 
                                                     
contract, and there was no evidence in the record to indicate whether the parties had requested an 
extension, the embryos in question could very well have been destroyed, which would render the case 
moot. Id. at 269–71. 
 80. Id. at 271. 
 81. In re Marriage of Nash, 2009 WL 1514842, at *5 (Wash. App. 2009). 
 82. Id. at *1, *3. 
 83. Id. at *3. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at *3, *5. 
 86. Id. at *1, *7. 
 87. See id. at *7; Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261, 267 (Wash. 2002). 
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had to find an alternative solution and chose to balance the interests of the 
parties. 
While neither of these cases provides a good model of analysis due 
to the strange five-year disposition provision potentially rendering the case 
moot in Litowitz and the odd drafting that created uncertainty in Nash, they 
do show that sole-progenitor cases are different than dual-progenitor 
cases. In both of these cases, the courts touched on the lack of a genetic 
connection between one party and the embryos and how that makes for a 
weaker claim of ownership rights. As Litowitz recognized, the genetic 
progenitor has a claim arising out of genetics, but the non-progenitor must 
rely on alternative claims of ownership.88 Therefore, in this kind of 
situation, the non-progenitor must rely on a claim arising out of parentage 
in an effort to stake a claim of ownership on any frozen embryos. This 
Note will now explore the various ways one may assert a legal right of 
parentage. 
III. PARENTAGE IN THE FROZEN EMBRYO CONTEXT 
When applying one of the dual-progenitor analytical frameworks,89 
courts often engage in a discussion of the rights and interests of the parties 
as parents as a way to establish ownership or responsibility.90 Parties have 
argued that they have ownership rights to embryos as a result of their role 
in the creation of the embryos or through their status as a potential legal 
parent. There are three main ways to determine who is a legal parent: (1) 
marital and gestational presumption, (2) biology, and (3) intentionality. 
While all methods are relevant, the intentionality argument is the main 
argument that a non-progenitor will have to rely on in a frozen embryo 
dispute. 
A. Marital and Gestational Presumptions 
Marital and gestational presumptions have traditionally been the 
primary statutory mechanisms through which parentage is determined. 
Gestational presumption presumes that a woman who gives birth to a child 
is the legal mother of that child.91 Similarly, the marital presumption 
presumes that the husband of a woman who gives birth to a child is the 
child’s legal father.92 If this marital presumption does not exist because the 
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mother of a child is unmarried, then the father may establish paternity 
through genetic testing or an acknowledgement of paternity.93 
However, these gestational and marital presumptions cannot be 
applied to determine ownership in the frozen embryo context. The main 
argument against these presumptions for frozen embryos is that these 
presumptions apply to children born to a woman.94 In cases involving 
frozen embryos, a child has not yet been born or even implanted in a 
uterus, and thus a mother cannot assert a claim of ownership based off 
marital or gestational presumption. 
Moreover, these methods are outdated for determining parentage. 
Traditionally, these presumptions have been used to determine which 
people are the biological parents of a child, and thus the legal parents. But 
in our current, modern age, people often become parents to children that 
are not biologically connected to them—whether through adoption, 
surrogacy, or in vitro fertilization with a donor. Additionally, in the wake 
of the legalization of same-sex marriage, courts are now presented with 
the question of how to establish parentage for children born to same-sex 
couples, where only one spouse is the biological parent.95 Because there 
are now so many different ways to form a family and have children, courts 
and legislatures have been forced to create new definitions for “legal 
parent” that extend beyond mere presumption. 
B. Biology 
The biological, or genetic-identity, approach determines parentage 
based upon who the biological parents of the child are or who is genetically 
related to the child.96 This approach recognizes that 
an important aspect of parenthood is the experience of creating 
another in one’s “own likeness.” Part of what makes parenthood 
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meaningful is the parent’s ability to see the child grow and develop 
and see oneself in the process of this growth. Through this process, 
the parent views himself or herself as a creative agent in nature.97 
Additionally, this approach can be diluted down to a simple property 
argument that “persons possess property rights in the products, processes, 
and organs of their bodies and in any commodities developed from these 
sources.”98 Because a child is a result of the products (sperm and eggs) and 
the processes (gestation) of the parents, the child is therefore property of 
the parents.99 
Again, this approach fails to take into account the various other ways 
in which families form. This argument is also not one that a non-progenitor 
can rely upon in asserting a claim of parentage and ownership, for obvious 
reasons. 
C. Intentionality 
One of the newest and broadest approaches to parentage is 
intentionality. The intentionality approach finds that the legal parents of a 
child are the people who intended to be the parents of a child.100 This often 
arises in surrogacy cases where a surrogate may have a statutory claim to 
parentage over the child through a gestational presumption, but the legal 
parents are the ones who intended to be the parents of the child and 
initiated the procreative process.101 The theory is that if it weren’t for the 
actions of those people, then the child in question would not exist.102 
The intentionality analysis is illustrated well by In re Marriage of 
Buzzanca.103 In this case, a couple acquired eggs and sperm from donors 
and used IVF to create an embryo.104 This embryo was then implanted into 
a surrogate who was to carry the baby to term and then turn the child over 
to the couple.105 However, during the pregnancy, the couple split up and 
the husband decided he no longer wanted the child.106 The trial court was 
then presented with six possible parents for this baby and concluded that 
                                                     
 97. John Lawrence Hill, What Does It Mean to Be A “Parent”? The Claims of Biology as the 
Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 353, 389 (1991) (emphasis in original). 
 98. Id. at 391. 
 99. For a discussion of why biology is not always sufficient to convey procreative rights, see 
generally id. 
 100. See In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 282 (1998); Johnson v. Calvert, 851 
P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993); see also Hill, supra note 97, at 414. 
 101. See, e.g., Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 282; Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782. 
 102. See id.; Hill, supra note 97, at 414–15. 
 103. See Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 280. 
 104. Id. at 282. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
2017] Yours, Mine, or Ours 1155 
none of them could be the legal parents, and therefore the child had no 
legal parents.107 The appellate court disagreed.108 
In regard to the gamete donors, the appellate court found that, while 
the unknown donors may have a genetic claim to the child, the intended 
parents had a superior claim based on intentionality, which acts as a 
tiebreaker in the event of a conflict.109 Today, the egg and sperm donors 
would be found to have relinquished their parentage rights upon donation 
and unable to be considered legal parents.110 The current Uniform 
Parentage Act (UPA) plainly states the parentage status of a donor: a donor 
is not a parent of a child conceived by means of assisted reproduction.111 
However, this statute was not in effect at the time of Buzzanca,112 and 
further, because the donors were unknown to the court, the appellate court 
did not spend much time arguing that the donors could be the legal 
parents.113 Thus, the genetic donors were rejected as legal parents, which 
left the surrogate and the intended parents of the child for legal parent 
consideration.114 
The surrogate’s basis for legal parentage arose from gestational 
maternity—she gave birth to the child.115 However, the appellate court 
found that the contract between the intended parents and the surrogate 
deemed the surrogate only a carrier, and but for the consent of the intended 
parents to allow the surrogate to carry and gestate the embryo, the child 
would not have been born.116 
The appellate court concluded that the intended parents were the 
legal parents of the child because of their responsibility for creating the 
child and their intention at the time of implantation to be the legal parents 
of the child.117 Because this couple brought all these people together to 
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help them create a child and but for their actions, they were determined to 
be the legal and responsible parents.118 
This approach could be applicable in a sole-progenitor,  
frozen-embryo dispute because it provides a method that the  
non-progenitor spouse could utilize to establish parentage rights over the 
embryo. As has been discussed, the non-progenitor would need to 
establish rights through either contract or intentionality because biology 
and marital and gestational presumptions are not applicable. However, 
conflicts between intentionality and biology in the existing case law 
demonstrate that a non-progenitor argument based solely upon 
intentionality is likely to fail. 
D. Conflict Between Biology and Intentionality 
An interesting case arose in California that discussed both 
intentionality and biology—Johnson v. Calvert.119 The court found that 
maternity could only be established through intentionality after both 
gestational and genetic options had been exhausted.120 The applicable 
statute was a part of the California Civil Code adopted from a section of 
the Uniform Parentage Act.121 
In Johnson, a couple contracted with a surrogate to carry their genetic 
embryo (embryo formed with husband’s sperm and wife’s egg).122 Things 
did not go well, and after relations between the couple and the surrogate 
mother broke down, the couple filed for a declaratory judgment to 
establish that they were the legal parents of the unborn child.123 The 
surrogate claimed that she was the mother of the child based on the fact 
that she would gestate and deliver the child,124 a valid form of proof of 
maternity under California law.125 The genetic mother based her claim on 
the fact that she was the biological mother of the child, also a valid form 
of proof of maternity.126 Because the statute127 recognized both forms, 
genetic and gestational, as establishing maternity, the court then moved to 
look at intentionality in order to resolve the dispute.128 The court 
recognized that the genetic mother had greater intentionality because, but 
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for her acts, the child would never be born.129 It was the genetic mother 
and father’s intention to have the surrogate carry the child and then return 
it to the couple to raise; it was not their intention to donate an embryo to 
the surrogate.130 Because the court found that the statute in question did 
not indicate a preference for genetic mother over gestational mother, or 
vice versa, it chose to look at intentionality as the “tiebreaker” in order to 
select one legal mother.131 The court concluded that the genetic, intentional 
mother had the superior claim.132 
While this intentionality framework establishes a common law way 
for the parent of a child born of assisted reproductive technology to 
establish parentage without being genetically related to or having birthed 
the child, it does not apply to sole-progenitor disputes. If this framework 
is applied to situations where only one spouse or “parent” is the genetic 
“parent” of a frozen embryo, then the intentionality argument never 
becomes relevant. In a dispute involving only one genetic “parent,” there 
is no dispute between a genetic and gestational mother because the “child” 
has not yet been born––there is no gestational mother. Therefore,  
as Johnson only looked to intentionality as a tiebreaker,133 a 
biological/genetic claim of parentage would trump any claim that another 
parent may have arising out of intentionality because intentionality should 
only come into play after other options have been exhausted. 
IV. PROPOSAL: ABSOLUTE GENETICS FRAMEWORK FOR  
SOLE-PROGENITOR DISPUTES 
As a result of this panoply of court decisions regarding frozen 
embryos, a new framework should be adopted. Both of the courts that were 
presented with sole-progenitor disputes, Litowitz and Nash, seemed to 
struggle with how to resolve these personal family issues when a contract 
either is not applicable or does not provide a sufficient solution. Both 
courts could have used a different framework to guide the analysis, as none 
of the current dual-progenitor frameworks were ideal given the situation 
presented. This Note advocates for a framework for the disposition of 
frozen embryos where the sole-genetic progenitor is always awarded sole 
custody and/or ownership rights in a dispute. 
This framework, which would favor the genetic progenitor in an 
absolute sense, is a more favorable framework for sole-progenitor disputes 
because the current frameworks either do not adequately resolve the 
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conflict or create too many foreseeable public policy concerns. The current 
frameworks (contemporaneous mutual consent,134 balancing test,135 and 
contractual136) simply do not work in a sole-progenitor dispute. The 
contemporaneous mutual assent framework is impractical; if the parties 
could agree on what to do with the embryo(s), they would not be in 
court.137 While the balancing test does allow the court to consider each 
party’s wishes and burdens, and any public policy concerns, it gives the 
court too much power. It places the entire outcome in the trial judge’s 
hands, which will inevitably lead to inconsistent rulings, more potential 
for abuse of discretion, and many appeals. An ideal, long-term solution 
would involve a broadly applicable standard, such as a uniform code for 
states to adopt, to guide judges or legislatures in making determinations. 
Neither the contemporaneous mutual assent approach nor the balancing 
test is a viable, long-term solution for these types of disputes. 
While most courts seem to favor the contractual approach, this 
approach too has one major flaw: it allows for the possibility that a person 
may be forced to become a parent against their will. This public policy 
concern that other courts have highlighted138 is so important that it must 
outweigh the benefits of relying on the parties’ contract. Holding people 
to earlier contracts when it could result in a person being forced to 
surrender or dispose of an embryo created with their genetic material or 
become a parent to a biological child that they do not want is simply 
unconscionable. Additionally, 
couples entering into premarital contracts often suffer from optimism 
bias. . . . This unfounded optimism may lead individuals to enter into 
deals that will not serve their interests in the future. Couples 
contemplating embryo disposition decisions likely share this 
optimism about the solidity of their marriage. Moreover, as we have 
seen, the social science research on embryo disposition decision 
making strongly confirms that parties entering into such agreements, 
at least at the time of treatment, will have difficulty forecasting their 
future views about disposition and exercising rational judgment.139 
While proponents of the contractual approach rely on contracts as 
manifestations of prior intent regarding the disposition of frozen embryos, 
these manifestations are not reliable. These contracts are executed while 
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the couples are still together, planning for their future, and theoretically, 
believing they will never divorce. While it is typically public policy to 
hold people to their prior agreements, because of the nature of  
the “property” involved—an embryo with the potential to become a  
child—and the circumstances under which the agreements are usually 
executed, they should not be honored in the sole-progenitor context. The 
public policy argument against forced procreation and against allowing an 
“uninvolved” party control over your “property” must outweigh the 
arguments in favor of honoring contracts. If a genetic progenitor wishes to 
relinquish their embryo to the non-genetically related spouse, they can still 
do so through adoption or other later-executed contracts. Further, if parties 
do not have an enforceable contract, they are left with no satisfactory 
framework at all. 
Those seeking to invalidate the argument that forced procreation 
should be avoided at all costs would point to instances where a person has 
no alternative means to beget biological children other than the frozen 
embryos created with their gametes. These cases tend to show that while 
courts seek to protect people from being forced to become biological 
parents, this rule is not absolute and can be overcome by a showing that 
the other party has no other reasonable means of biological procreation.140 
Proponents of the contractual approach would ask: What about people who 
are no longer able to have children of their own? Should they be forced to 
surrender their only hopes of having biologically related children just 
because their partner has changed his/her mind and no longer wants to be 
a parent? While these are valid concerns, none of these issues are relevant 
because those issues assume the embryo has been created with two 
biological parents. This proposed genetic framework should only be 
applied to sole-progenitor disputes. In sole-progenitor disputes, only one 
spouse is the genetic progenitor; thus, there can never be a situation where 
one’s right not to procreate is violated in order to allow another his/her 
only chance at becoming a biological parent. While the contractual 
approach may be the best framework for dual-progenitor disputes, it is not 
the best for sole-progenitor disputes. 
The public policy of avoiding forced procreation is one of the 
primary concerns that this genetic framework seeks to address. For a court 
to affirmatively allow another person to cause your child to be born against 
your will would violate your right to be free from unwanted governmental 
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intrusion on this private, personal area of life.141 It is also not good policy 
to allow a court to award a non-progenitor an embryo, something that has 
the potential for life, over and against any opposition from a genetic 
progenitor. Even if contrary to a contract, the sole progenitors should 
always be awarded the embryos by virtue of their genetic connection and 
the other spouse’s lack of genetic connection. 
Some may argue that intentionality is a valid way to establish 
parentage and that the non-biological “parent” has rights as an intended 
parent. The spouses came together and formed an embryo jointly with the 
intention to birth and parent a child together. However, genetics remains 
one of the primary ways to establish parentage; because the embryo was 
created using that person’s genetic material, this person would be 
considered the legal and natural parent of any resulting child.142 The other 
person, who does not share any genetics with the embryo, therefore has 
two main ways to establish legal parentage over any resulting child: 
marital presumption143 or intentionality.144 As discussed previously, 
marital presumption applies to children who have been born;145 as the 
embryo is only a frozen embryo and not a born child, this presumption 
does not yet apply. The non-biologically connected person is then left with 
an argument for rights arising out of intentionality: he or she is the 
intended parent of this embryo, but for the actions of this person and 
his/her spouse, the embryo would not exist.146 However, there is no intent 
until the embryo has been implanted and has the active potential to become 
a child. To that end, courts have stated that the value of embryos lie in 
their “potential to become, after implantation, growth and birth, 
children.”147 
This point of implantation is an important distinction. It has appeared 
in statutes and cases. Many states have enacted statutes that address frozen 
embryo disputes.148 
These statutes seek to clarify that if a marriage dissolves or, in some 
cases, a dissolution action is filed, prior to placement of gametes or 
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embryos, the former spouse will not be considered the legal parent of 
any subsequently resulting child, unless the former spouse consented 
in writing to be a parent of a child if the assisted reproduction 
occurred after marital dissolution.149 
If the couple divorces prior to the placement or implantation of embryos, 
the non-genetic parent would not be considered the legal parent of any 
resulting child.150 
In addition to the legislature, courts have also dealt with the 
distinction between frozen embryos and implanted embryos.151 For 
example, in In re Baby S, the husband and wife contracted with a surrogate 
to carry a child created with the husband’s sperm and a donor egg.152 
During the pregnancy, the wife separated from the husband and indicated 
her intent to file for divorce.153 The surrogate filed a petition declaring that 
the husband and wife were the legal parents while the wife sought to 
invalidate the surrogate contract, and thus be relieved of her status as the 
legal mother.154 Because the surrogate contract identified both parties as 
the “intended parents,” and because all of the wife’s actions leading up to 
and after the embryo was implanted were ones of an intended parent, the 
court found that “[the baby] would not have been born but for [the wife’s] 
actions and express agreement to be the child’s legal mother.”155 Had this 
separation of the couple taken place prior to implantation of the embryo, 
there would have been no issue regarding parentage because there would 
be no baby. Once an embryo has been implanted and the female carrier is 
confirmed as pregnant, then there will be a child in nine months. 
Implanting the embryo so it may develop into a child is the additional step 
that is necessary for intentionality; at that point, but for the actions of the 
intended parents, the child would not exist. The same cannot be said of a 
frozen embryo. Additionally, most courts have not found that an embryo 
constitutes a child, but instead a kind of “special property”;156 thus there 
can be no “parents.”157 Therefore, the argument that the non-biological 
spouse in a sole-progenitor dispute has a claim to the embryo arising out 
of parental intentionality is moot because there is not yet a child. 
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Further, courts have found that intentionality is only a tiebreaker 
when there is a conflict between other valid forms of maternity or 
paternity, such as gestational and genetic.158 The court in Johnson v. 
Calvert recognized that intentionality is used as a means to select one 
parent when there are two valid competing legal claims.159 As such, if a 
court were deliberating between a genetic parent and an intentional parent, 
the genetic parent would have the stronger claim under Johnson.160 The 
court there recognized that a genetic link or presumption is greater than an 
argument for intentionality.161 
There is no better framework that adequately protects the interests of 
genetic progenitors. This framework would help courts in sole-progenitor 
disputes by creating a more bright line rule that would not only give courts 
more guidance in resolving these disputes but also allow people 
considering IVF a clearer understanding of what will happen to their 
embryos if the couple divorces. Under this proposal, the genetic progenitor 
is always given the sole right of ownership and control over the embryos, 
even if a contract says differently. This right may only transfer to the  
non-genetic party if the sole progenitor relinquishes rights and essentially 
donates the embryos to the other party. Otherwise, the sole-genetic 
progenitor may do whatever he or she wishes with the embryos, regardless 
of the wishes of the other party. By placing absolute ownership in the 
hands of the genetic progenitor, courts would guarantee that public policy 
would never be violated by authorizing forced procreation. 
CONCLUSION 
As the current analytical frameworks being utilized by courts in  
dual-progenitor, frozen-embryo disputes do not adequately address the 
concerns present in sole-progenitor disputes, a new framework is 
necessary for these sole-genetic progenitor situations. This Note advocates 
for courts to implement a framework that grants the sole genetic progenitor 
absolute rights of ownership over the frozen embryos, as the  
non-genetically related spouse has no sufficient available ownership 
theory upon which to claim legal rights over the embryos. 
This proposed framework would create a more efficient solution for 
settling sole-progenitor disputes. As IVF continues to become more 
prevalent and less expensive, and as couples continue to put off 
childbearing until later in life, situations such as these are likely to arise 
more frequently. Courts should not be limited to the three original 
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frameworks (contemporaneous mutual assent, balancing, and contractual), 
but should instead take the time to delve into the rights of each party under 
the circumstances. 
While some legislatures have attempted to aid in the resolution of 
these issues by enacting statutes that clarify that if a couple divorces prior 
to any implantation of embryos, the non-biological parent will not be 
considered a legal parent of any resulting children, this is only one step 
toward widespread clarity.162 Other states should follow suit and enact a 
statute that would accomplish this goal of preventing a non-genetically 
related spouse from laying claim to embryos in a divorce. Alternatively, a 
uniform code or addition to the UPA would be helpful to create 
consistency among the states and give more guidance to courts and couples 
considering IVF. As the body of assisted reproductive technology law 
continues to grow, either state legislatures or courts will have to respond 
to these new technologies in order to protect societal interests. 
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